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THESES
•	 The	 political	 and	 economic	 co-operation	 between	 the	 United	 States	 and	
Germany	 has	 for	many	 years	 been	 a	 subject	 of	 disputes	 and	 tension.	 In	
addition	 to	 the	 differences	 over	 the	 US	 engagement	 in	 the	 resolution	 of	
international	conflicts,	bilateral	 relations	have	been	strained	as	a	conse-
quence	 of	 the	 so-called	 Snowden	 scandal	 and	 the	 unproved	 allegations	
that	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel’s	telephone	was	wiretapped.	Many	German	
economists	and	politicians	have	criticised	the	USA	for	contributing	to	the	
financial	crisis	in	2007	as	a	consequence	of	maintaining	low	interest	rates	
and	allowing	banks	to	sell	high-risk	financial	instruments.	US	politicians	
and	economists	have,	in	turn,	criticised	the	manner	in	which	the	govern-
ment	 in	Berlin	has	been	dealing	with	the	eurozone	crisis	and	the	 lack	of	
consent	given	to	the	mutualisation	 	of	Eurozone	debts.	Germany	and	the	
United	States	have	also	disagreed	over	foreign	trade	on	the	international	
arena.	Germany,	a	country	with	one	of	the	world’s	largest	trade	surpluses,	
and	the	USA,	a	country	with	one	of	the	world’s	highest	trade	deficits,	have	
accused	one	another	of	pursuing	a	flawed	economic	policy,	as	at	 the	G20	
forum,	for	instance.
•	 The	Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	(TTIP)	appears	to	of-
fer	a	chance	for	improving	relations	between	Germany	and	the	USA	for	the	
first	time	in	many	years.	Producers	and	exporters	from	the	two	countries	
may	benefit	from	the	lifting	of	some	barriers	to	transatlantic	economic	co-
operation.	Enhancing	mutual	economic	dependence	may	create	conditions	
for	the	improvement	of	the	political	climate.	Furthermore,	the	emergence	
of	what	is	in	fact	an	internal	EU	and	US	market,	with	reduced	customs	tar-
iffs	and	harmonised	legal	and	economic	rules,	will	pressure	the	emerging	
economies	to	make	their	markets	more	open.	It	may	also	help	reduce	the	
resistance	 of	 such	 countries	 as	 China	 and	 India	 in	multilateral	 negotia-
tions	concerning	 liberalisation	of	global	 trade	as	part	of	 the	WTO.	These	
countries	may	fear	restrictions	in	the	access	of	their	domestic	companies	
to	the	common	transatlantic	market.	It	may	also	be	expected	that	future	
trade	and	investment	agreements	signed	by	the	EU	and	the	USA	with	other	
countries	will	have	to	include	standards	based	on	the	TTIP	(for	example,	as	
regards	patent	protection),	which	would	make	it	possible	to	exert	pressure	
on	other	countries	worldwide	into	adopting	transatlantic	legislation.	
•	 German	 companies	 may	 be	 among	 the	 key	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	 TTIP.	
According	to	data	from	the	Federal	Statistical	Office,	in	2014,	the	USA	was	
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the	second	largest	outlet	for	German	exporters,	who	sold	goods	there	worth	
96	billion	euros	(8.5%	of	total	German	exports).	 In	turn,	US	manufactur-
ers	supplied	goods	worth	49	billion	euros	 (5%	of	German	 imports)	 to	 the	
German	market.	Germany	thus	had	a	considerable	surplus	 in	trade	with	
the	USA,	 reaching	47	billion	euros.	According	 to	 estimates,	 the	prices	of	
German	goods	on	 the	US	market	could	be	as	much	as	20%	higher	due	 to	
customs	duty	and	production	standards	differing	from	those	applicable	in	
the	EU.	German	producers	also	hope	that	the	US	public	procurement	mar-
ket	will	become	more	open	to	them.	Foreign	companies	are	currently	given	
access	to	only	33%	of	such	tenders	in	the	USA,	while	the	respective	ratio	in	
the	EU	is	90%.	
•	 The	TTIP	may	create	conditions	for	exporting	US	raw	materials	from	un-
conventional	sources	to	the	European	Union;	and	this	will	be	a	benefit	of	
geopolitical	significance	for	Germany.	The	TTIP	will	automatically	facili-
tate	natural	gas	exports,	since	export	permits	are	not	required	in	the	case	
of	 countries	with	which	 the	United	States	has	 signed	a	 free	 trade	agree-
ment.	Berlin	has	put	pressure	on	Brussels	to	make	efforts	towards	convinc-
ing	the	USA	to	at	least	partially	lift	the	ban	on	crude	oil	exports	imposed	in	
the	1970s.	The	German	government	is	increasingly	aware	of	the	fact	that	
diversification	of	supplies	of	fossil	fuels	to	Europe	will	make	it	more	diffi-
cult	for	Moscow	to	use	such	supplies	as	an	instrument	of	political	pressure	
on	the	EU.	Russia’s	position	as	a	reliable	supplier	of	fossil	fuels	to	Germany	
has	been	increasingly	weakening	due	to	its	military	activity	in	Ukraine.	
•	 The	government	coalition	in	Germany	initially	supported	signing	the	TTIP	
almost	 unreservedly.	 However,	 the	 Social	 Democrats	 (SPD)	 have	 found	
themselves	under	increasing	pressure	from	left-wing	circles.	Even	though	
the	SPD	leader,	Sigmar	Gabriel,	who	serves	as	the	minister	for	the	economy,	
can	see	the	economic	benefits	from	Germany	signing	the	TTIP,	he	cannot	
completely	disregard	the	criticism	from	some	left-wing	organisations	and	
some	German	business.	Therefore,	he	is	likely	to	insist	on	the	removal	of	
the	most	controversial	provisions	(as	viewed	by	German	public	opinion):	
the	right	vested	in	foreign	investors	under	the	TTIP	to	bypass	the	German	
legal	system	and	sue	state	institutions	in	international	arbitration	courts,	
which	is	seen	in	Germany	as	a	threat	to	the	country’s	sovereignty.	Given	
the	resistance	inside	the	SPD,	the	German	government	is	likely	to	demand	
that	the	TTIP	agreement	be	ratified	in	the	national	parliaments	of	EU	mem-
ber	states.	However,	 this	 solution	carries	 the	risk	 that	 some	EU	member	
states	might	veto	the	deal.	
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I. TTIP – The essence of The agreemenT
A	joint	declaration	of	the	US	president	and	the	president	of	the	European	Com-
mission	 (EC)	at	 the	G8	 summit	on	 17	 June	2013	marked	 the	beginning	of	 the	
negotiations	concerning	the	Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	
(TTIP).	Officially,	 the	negotiations	have	been	conducted	by	 the	EU’s	Directo-
rate-General	for	Trade	and	the	Office	of	the	United	States	Trade	Representative.	
Among	the	reasons	the	EC	has	mentioned	for	embarking	on	the	negotiations	
are:	the	global	economic	crisis,	the	lack	of	effects	from	the	multilateral	nego-
tiations	conducted	as	part	of	 the	World	Trade	Organisation	and	the	difficul-
ties	in	setting	out	common	rules	for	subsidising	agriculture	in	the	EU	and	the	
USA1.	The	main	goals	of	the	TTIP	include:	eliminating	customs	duty	in	trade	
between	the	USA	and	the	EU,	reducing	the	non-tariff	barriers	(various	regu-
lations	 restricting	 the	market	access	 for	goods),	harmonisation	of	 standards	
and	technical	norms,	and	adopting	regulations	that	will	offer	stronger	protec-
tion	to	foreign	investment	than	the	existing	domestic	legislation.	Both	parties	
hope	 that	 the	boost	 in	 trade	resulting	 from	the	 liquidation	of	 these	barriers	
will	contribute	to	improving	the	economic	situation	after	the	difficult	years	of	
the	economic	crisis.	If	the	TTIP	negotiations	are	successful,	a	market	covering	
800	million	consumers,	50%	of	global	production,	30%	of	global	trade	and	60%	
of	global	investments	will	be	created	within	a	few	years’	time.	
The	European	Commission	has	been	granted	the	mandate	to	enter	into	the	most	
extensive	agreement	possible	aimed	at	liberalising	trade	between	the	EU	and	
the	USA	on	a	much	deeper	level	than	that	happening	as	part	of	the	World	Trade	
Organisation.	Trade	in	cultural	and	audiovisual	goods	has	been	excluded	from	
liberalisation	at	the	request	of	France2.	The	negotiations	have	been	conducted	
in	rounds	scheduled	every	few	months	in	over	20	working	groups,	and	consul-
tations	on	their	repercussions	have	taken	place	within	the	narrowest	possible	
circles.	Both	Washington	and	Brussels	want	thus	to	eliminate	pressure	from	
lobbyists	and	public	opinion	on	the	negotiation	process.	Both	the	EU	and	the	
USA	hope	that	the	presentation	of	the	agreement	in	the	final	version,	which	
can	only	be	either	accepted	or	rejected,	will	increase	the	likelihood	of	its	being	
implemented.	Furthermore,	to	avoid	the	growing	concern	in	public	opinion,	an	
advisory	group	of	14	experts	was	formed,	consisting	of	representatives	of	trade	
unions,	consumer	organisations	and	business	groups.	Since	October	2014,	the	
1	 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/questions-and-answers/
2	 The	European	Commission’s	mandate	to	negotiate	the	TTIP	is	available	at:	http://data.con-
silium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf
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mandate	and	many	details	concerning	the	negotiation	process	on	the	part	of	
the	 EU	have	 been	 declassified	 as	 a	 result	 of	 pressure	 from	European	 public	
opinion.	Both	parties	to	the	negotiations	have	agreed	to	finalise	the	negotia-
tion	process	by	the	end	of	2015.	It	is	still	unclear	what	the	procedure	for	ratifi-
cation	of	the	negotiated	agreement	will	be	like.	One	possible	solution	is	that	the	
Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	will	decide	whether	the	agreement	is	
an	ordinary	agreement	and	will	have	to	be	accepted	only	by	the	Council	of	the	
European	Union	and	the	European	Parliament	(EP)	or	whether	it	is	a	so-called	
‘mixed	agreement’,	in	which	case	an	additional	consent	from	national	parlia-
ments	will	also	be	required3.	If	the	latter	variant	is	chosen,	this	will	complicate	
the	process	of	negotiating	the	agreement,	since	it	may	give	rise	to	public	con-
cern	in	many	countries	which	were	plunged	into	economic	crisis.	Many	states	
view	 the	TTIP	as	another	 stage	on	 the	way	 towards	 the	 liberalisation	of	EU	
markets	which	may	result	in	growing	unemployment.	Problems	with	ratifying	
the	agreement	may	also	appear	at	the	European	Parliament	forum,	since	the	
left-wing	and	Euro-sceptic	groupings	may	be	unwilling	to	back	it.	For	example,	
the	election	manifesto	of	France’s	National	Front,	which	has	had	its	represent-
atives	in	the	EP	since	2014,	includes	a	protest	against	this	deal,	which	has	been	
compared	to	an	“ultraliberal,	antidemocratic	and	anti-social	war	machine	that	
serves	mainly	the	Neo-Liberals	and	large	corporations”4.	
3	 http://www.taz.de/!137588/
4	 Polish	 Press	 Agency’s	 dispatch,	 26	 May	 2014,	 ‘Sukces	 wyborczy	 Frontu	 Narodowego	 –	
początek	nowych	podziałów	politycznych	w	UE’.
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II. The PolITIcal conTexT of The negoTIaTIons  
from BerlIn’s PoInT of vIew 
From	Berlin’s	viewpoint,	the	negotiations	concerning	the	Transatlantic	Trade	
and	Investment	Partnership	with	the	USA	may	bring	numerous	benefits	as	well	
as	some	threats.	First	and	foremost,	the	deal	with	the	USA	is	in	line	with	Ger-
many’s	economic	interests	worldwide.	An	economic	consolidation	of	Western	
countries	that	will	be	an	outcome	of	the	TTIP	may	offer	both	the	United	States	
and	the	EU	more	opportunities	to	influence	the	emerging	economies.	The	USA	
fears	the	growing	significance	of	China,	whose	GDP	may	soon	be	larger	than	
that	of	 the	US.	Germany	 is	 also	more	and	more	dependent	on	 the	emerging	
economies,	but	at	the	same	time	sees	the	risk	of	leakage	of	key	German	tech-
nologies,	since	it	is	difficult	to	impose	Western	legal	standards	on	developing	
countries,	for	example	as	regards	patent	protection.	Furthermore,	the	process	
of	trade	 liberalisation	and	harmonisation	of	trade	rules	as	part	of	the	World	
Trade	Organisation	has	failed	to	bring	the	expected	results	over	the	past	few	
years	due	to	 the	 increasing	assertiveness	of	 the	new	economic	powers,	such	
as	China,	India	and	Brazil5.	Germany	has	also	been	dissatisfied	with	the	nu-
merous	restrictions	on	access	to	public	tenders	in	the	lucrative	non-European	
markets	such	as	China,	for	example6.	Western	countries,	as	an	economic	bloc	
with	similar	trade	regulations,	might	have	more	opportunities	to	impose	their	
standards	and	technological	norms	on	other	countries.	One	proof	of	this	is	in	
the	European	Commission’s	goals:	the	EC	intends	as	part	of	the	TTIP	negotia-
tions	to	set	the	conditions	for	promoting	a	common	patent	protection	and	cre-
ate	a	 common	 framework	 for	 the	use	of	 subsidies	and	anti-dumping	 instru-
ments7.	If	the	TTIP	gave	the	EU	a	new	external	stimulus,	given	the	absence	of	
other	promising	projects	in	the	EU’s	external	policy	at	this	moment,	Germany	
would	see	this	as	an	additional	benefit	accruing	from	the	TTIP.	Furthermore,	
the	TTIP	may	 also	help	 improve	 the	 economic	 situation	 in	 the	EU	 and	 thus	
counteract	 the	economic	stagnation	 linked	 to	 the	eurozone	crisis.	Easier	ac-
cess	to	the	US	market	will	also	certainly	add	strength	to	German	exporters,	
who	already	hold	a	large	share	in	the	US	market.	
5	 ‘WTO	 gescheitert:	 Indien	 verweigert	 Abbau	 globaler	 Handelshürden’,	 http://www.
deutsche-mittelstands-nachrichten.de/2014/08/64679/
6	 Konrad	 Popławski,	 ‘Chasing	 globalisation:	 Germany’s	 economic	 relations	with	 the	 BRIC	
countries’,	OSW Report, Warsaw	2013,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/raport_05_
bric_ang.pdf
7	 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-564_en.htm?utm_source=API&utm_
medium=twitter
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The	Russian-Ukrainian	war	is	a	new	element	that	will	make	the	German	gov-
ernment	more	willing	to	support	the	TTIP.	Berlin	may	fear	that	Russia,	whose	
foreign	policy	is	aggressive	and	ever	less	predictable,	will	also	be	a	less	reliable	
supplier	of	raw	materials	 to	 the	German	market8.	 In	2014,	Moscow	made	at-
tempts	to	put	pressure	on	EU	member	states	to	limit	their	support	for	Ukraine,	
for	example,	by	embarking	on	negotiations	concerning	Russian	gas	supplies	to	
China,	and	cutting	gas	supplies	to	those	countries	engaged	in	sending	gas	to	
Ukraine	from	the	west,	such	as	Poland	and	Slovakia.	The	continuation	of	talks	
on	TTIP	 is	a	 form	of	defence	against	such	moves	 from	Moscow,	demonstrat-
ing	that	 the	EU	also	possesses	strong	arguments	 in	the	economic	confronta-
tion	with	Russia.	Therefore,	even	if	the	scope	of	the	TTIP	is	limited	and	fails	
to	bring	about	a	 significant	 increase	 in	 imports	of	oil	and	gas	 from	the	USA	
to	the	EU,	what	is	 in	fact	the	emergence	of	an	internal	Western	market	may	
be	 viewed	 by	 Russia	 and	 China	 as	 tightening	 a	 politico-economic	 alliance,	
something	that	could	be	defined	as	an	economic	NATO.	As	a	consequence,	they	
may	fear	 that	access	 for	 their	companies	 to	EU	and	US	markets	could	be	re-
stricted.	However,	this	perception	of	the	TTIP	deal	by	the	emerging	economies	
may	also	be	pose	a	threat	to	Berlin’s	foreign	policy.	Many	German	analysts	are	
concerned	that	the	transatlantic	partnership	could	be	viewed	by	the	emerging	
economies	as	an	attempt	by	Western	countries	to	isolate	themselves	from	the	
developing	countries9.	Germany	does	not	want	the	TTIP	to	be	viewed	in	this	
way,	because	it	might	harm	its	interests	in	the	emerging	markets,	which	have	
been	an	important	engine	for	German	economic	growth	during	the	time	of	the	
global	economic	crisis10.	
Political	relations	between	Washington	and	Berlin	also	provide	an	important	
context	for	the	TTIP	negotiations,	especially	given	the	fact	that	more	and	more	
economic	disputes	have	been	seen	between	them	in	international	forums	over	
recent	years.	The	main	tendency	visible	in	relations	between	these	two	coun-
tries	 is	Germany’s	 increasing	emancipation	 in	 foreign	policy	and	unwilling-
ness	to	continue	playing	the	role	of	the	US’s	younger	brother.	Washington	and	
Berlin	have	already	presented	different	stances,	such	as	on	the	US	intervention	
8	 http://www.haz.de/Nachrichten/Politik/Deutschland-Welt/DIW-Energieexpertin-Kem-
fert-ueber-Gas-Versorgung-in-Europa-aus-Russland
9	 Evita	Schmieg,	 ‘TTIP	–	Chancen	und	Risiken	für	Entwicklungsländer’,	http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/zeitschriftenschau/2014zs01_scm.pdf
10	 Konrad	 Popławski,	 ‘Chasing	 globalisation:	 Germany’s	 economic	 relations	with	 the	 BRIC	
countries’,	OSW Report, Warsaw	2013,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/raport_05_
bric_ang.pdf
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in	 Iraq,	 and	differed	 in	 their	 approaches	 to	 reform	of	 the	United	Nations	or	
other	visions	regarding	the	architecture	of	international	financial	markets	as	
in	the	time	of	George	W.	Bush’s	presidency11.	However,	the	economic	crisis	pre-
sent	since	2007	has	brought	out	a	major	difference	in	their	approaches	to	the	
economy.	Consumption	has	traditionally	played	a	major	role	 in	US	economic	
development.	As	 a	 consequence	of	 this,	 the	US	has	 a	 long-standing	problem	
with	its	high	trade	deficit.	In	turn,	Germany’s	situation	is	quite	the	contrary;	
it	has	had	a	significant	surplus	in	foreign	trade	owing	to	the	frugality	policy	
adopted	by	it	over	the	past	decade.	
These	different	economic	backgrounds	have	led	to	economic	disputes	between	
the	USA	and	Germany.	For	example,	the	USA	accused	Germany	at	the	G20	sum-
mit	in	2010	of	pursuing	a	harmful	and	mercantilist	economic	policy	focused	
only	on	 stimulating	 its	 own	exports,	which	was	not	balanced	by	an	equally	
rapid	increase	in	imports,	thus	contributing	to	the	emergence	of	economic	im-
balances	worldwide.	Berlin	retorted,	pointing	out	the	chronic	trade	deficit	in	
the	USA	combined	with	the	 low	competitiveness	of	 the	US	economy	and	the	
tendency	toward	excessive	debt	accumulation.	
When	the	economic	situation	in	the	eurozone	deteriorated,	the	USA	intensified	
its	criticism	of	the	German	economy,	which,	in	the	opinion	of	many	American	
economists,	such	as	the	Nobel	Prize	winner	Paul	Krugman12	or	the	financier	
George	Soros,	was	based	to	an	excessive	extent	on	significant	trade	surpluses,	
thus	being	harmful	to	the	eurozone	and	the	world.	According	to	them,	Germa-
ny,	capitalising	on	the	economic	boom	at	home,	should	have	raised	its	invest-
ment	spending	and	wages,	and	thus	support	the	European	economy.	American	
experts	also	suggested	that	the	European	Central	Bank	should	reprint	money	
(launch	loans	to	countries	and	commercial	banks	unsecured	by	the	eurozone	
member	states’	real	income)	or	find	any	other	means	for	distributing	the	eu-
rozone’s	debt	among	all	its	member	states.	Washington	was	interested	above	
all	in	calming	the	situation	in	the	eurozone	as	soon	as	possible,	since	the	risk	
of	its	collapse	might	bring	losses	to	US	banks	and	investment	funds.	Germa-
ny	also	had	a	different	stance	on	the	eurozone	crisis.	Ever	since	the	risk	that	
monetary	union	might	disintegrate	emerged,	Germany	has	promoted	the	need	
to	introduce	the	frugality	policy	in	those	countries	facing	the	highest	risk	of	
11	 Andreas	Geldner,	‘Gerhard	Schröder	in	den	USA:	Der	ehemalige	Bush-Kritiker	preist	Ameri-
ka	 an’,	 http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.gerhard-schroeder-in-den-usa-der-ehe-
malige-bush-kritiker-preist-amerika-an.54c2e595-d85d-4907-b633-9b7b3a43ebb1.html
12	 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/opinion/krugman-those-depressing-germans.html
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bankruptcy,	and	has	blocked	the	possibility	of	joint	responsibility	for	the	euro-
zone’s	debts.	No	one	in	Berlin	was	ready	to	make	such	serious	concessions	and	
risk	German	taxpayers’	money	to	save	the	eurozone	member	states	at	risk	of	
insolvency.	Given	the	economic	disputes	witnessed	between	Berlin	and	Wash-
ington	over	the	past	few	years,	the	TTIP	offers	a	chance	for	a	new	beginning	in	
mutual	relations	and	for	fewer	economic	disputes.	
13
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III. The TTIP’s economIc sIgnIfIcance for germany 
Germany	may	benefit	 strongly	 from	 the	TTIP	being	 signed,	 considering	 the	
large	volume	of	US-German	trade.	The	USA	is	Germany’s	fourth	largest	trade	
partner	in	terms	of	trade	volume	–	only	France,	Holland	and	China	are	more	
important	trade	partners	for	Germany.	German	firms	employ	600,000	people	
in	 the	USA,	while	US	companies	offer	800,000	 jobs	 in	Germany.	Berlin	may	
expect	economic	benefits	as	a	result	of	two	changes:	liberalisation	of	trade	in	
goods	and	services,	and	diversification	of	energy	supplies	to	Germany.	In	turn,	
harmonisation	of	investment	regulations	is	the	source	of	greatest	concern	in	
Germany.	
1. The liberalisation of trade in goods and services
According	to	data	from	the	Federal	Statistical	Office13,	in	2014,	the	USA	was	the	
second	largest	outlet	for	German	exporters,	who	sold	goods	there	worth	96	bil-
lion	euros	(8,5%	of	total	German	exports).	In	turn,	US	manufacturers	supplied	
goods	worth	49	billion	euros	(5%	of	German	imports)	to	the	German	market.	
Germany	thus	had	a	considerable	surplus	in	trade	with	the	USA,	amounting	
to	47	billion	euros.	Germany	achieved	this	surplus	mainly	by	selling	cars,	ma-
chinery,	 chemistry,	 optical	products	and	electronic	devices.	US	partners,	 in	
turn,	 benefited	 from	 trade	 in	 cellular	 telephones,	 aviation	devices,	 precious	
metals	 and	 some	 chemical	 and	 electronic	 products14.	 Trade	with	 the	United	
States	 brought	 Germany	 the	 largest	 surplus,	 followed	 by	 other	 EU	member	
states,	such	as	France	(36	billion	euros),	the	United	Kingdom	(33	billion	euros)	
and	Austria	(19	billion	euro).	It	is	worth	emphasising	that	German	exports	to	
the	USA	have	outweighed	imports	from	this	country	even	more	since	the	fi-
nancial	crisis,	mainly	owing	to	the	constant	increase	in	the	sales	of	German	
goods	on	the	US	market	over	recent	years.	
The	 large	 imbalance	 in	German-US	 trade	 to	Germany’s	 advantage	 is	 often	
criticised	 by	US	politicians	 and	 economists.	Germany	has	 been	 accused	 of	
excessively	 stimulating	 exports	 by	 artificially	 withholding	 an	 increase	 in	
wages.	The	USA	has	also	addressed	similar	accusations	to	China	on	a	much	
larger	 scale.	 The	 USA	 criticises	 Germany	 even	 though	 it	 knows	 that	 the	
federal	government	lacks	the	ability	(and	also	the	will)	to	reduce	the	trade	
13	 https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Aussenhandel/
Handelspartner/Handelspartner.html
14	 http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/
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surplus.	Furthermore,	Washington	has	failed	to	mention	the	benefits	result-
ing	from	the	influx	of	cheap	German	capital,	which	allows	financing	of	 in-
vestments	 and	 innovations	 in	 the	USA.	Data	 concerning	German-US	 trade	
also	proves	that	Germany	has	been	rapidly	developing	trade	and	investment	
co-operation	with	the	USA	and	has	an	economy	which	is	more	competitive	
than	that	of	the	United	States.	For	this	reason,	German	producers	may	ben-
efit	the	most	from	the	TTIP	being	signed.	In	turn,	boosting	service	sales	to	EU	
countries	may	be	used	by	the	USA	to	stimulate	its	exports	to	Germany,	since	
it	has	a	competitive	advantage	in	this	area.	US	companies	are	the	leaders	in	
global	rankings	as	regards	offering	various	online	services,	software	devel-
opment	and	production	of	electronic	appliances.	Furthermore,	Washington	
may	expect	that	trade	facilitations	will	make	US	firms	more	willing	to	export	
their	goods	and	services	at	the	expense	of	domestic	sales.	Germany	is	one	of	
the	most	open	economies.	According	to	the	World	Bank’s	data,	German	ex-
ports	account	for	51%	of	the	country’s	GDP,	while	in	the	case	of	the	USA	this	
coefficient	is	much	lower,	reaching	13%.
Curbing	the	so-called	‘non-tariff’	measures,	i.e.	various	administrative	barri-
ers,	such	as	licences,	permits	and	approvals	(especially	as	regards	regulations	
concerning	 food	 and	 product	 safety	 standards),	which	 increase	 the	 product	
price	on	the	target	market,	might	be	a	much	more	important	benefit	of	the	TTIP	
deal	than	the	reduction	of	customs	tariffs.	According	to	the	Germany	Ministry	
for	the	Economy,	the	prices	of	German	goods	on	the	US	market	could	be	even	
20%	higher	due	to	the	need	to	meet	additional	requirements	to	those	existing	
in	 Europe.	 Savings	 resulting	 from	 limiting	 the	 spending	 on	 bureaucracy	 in	
state	institutions	and	companies	could	represent	an	additional	benefit,	since	
product	certification	procedures	require	engagement	from	the	state	apparatus	
and	are	time-consuming	for	firms.	Furthermore,	the	TTIP	is	likely	to	result	in	
liberalising	mutual	access	to	public	tenders.	For	example,	public	institutions	
in	the	USA	are	required	by	law	to	favour	US	producers.	Germany	could	benefit	
a	 lot	 from	the	opening	up	of	 the	extremely	 lucrative	US	public	procurement	
market	to	foreign	producers.	At	present,	foreign	companies	are	provided	ac-
cess	to	only	33%	of	such	tenders	in	the	USA,	while	the	respective	ratio	in	the	EU	
is	90%15.	However,	the	USA	expects	that	the	EU’s	structural	funds	will	become	
more	open	to	US	firms	in	exchange	for	 this.	Paradoxically,	 the	TTIP	may	be	
used	by	Germany	as	a	way	of	reducing	the	barriers	for	German	producers	in	
trade	within	the	EU.	For	example,	over	the	past	few	years	France	and	Italy	have	
15	 http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_arbp_303.pdf
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protected	 their	 domestic	 markets	 from	 competition	 offered	 by	 German	 car	
manufacturers	by	introducing	very	strict	ecological	regulations	under	which	
CO2	emissions	must	be	on	a	very	low	level,	a	requirement	difficult	to	meet	for	
many	German	luxury	car	manufacturers.	
Financial	services	are	likely	to	be	excluded	from	the	TTIP,	since	it	is	already	
known	at	the	present	stage	that	the	differences	in	mechanisms	for	regulating	
the	capital	markets	are	too	substantial.	The	USA,	which	has	significantly	tight-
ened	supervision	over	the	financial	markets	since	the	financial	crisis,	is	con-
cerned	that	these	regulations	might	be	diluted	as	a	consequence	of	a	possible	
alignment	thereof	with	EU	legislation16.	The	EU	is	not	interested	in	harmonis-
ing	standards	in	this	area	since	numerous	complex	mechanisms	for	the	super-
vision	of	financial	institutions	characteristic	of	the	eurozone,	for	example	as	
part	of	the	banking	union,	have	been	introduced	over	the	past	few	years17.	Fur-
thermore,	the	German	political	and	economic	elites	have	put	the	blame	mostly	
on	 the	USA	 for	Germany’s	economic	problems	 following	 the	global	financial	
crisis.	German	banks	were	among	 the	major	buyers	of	US	bonds	 in	 the	real	
estate	sector.	When	the	speculative	bubble	burst,	the	German	financial	sector	
sustained	enormous	losses,	which	forced	the	German	government	to	bail	out	
institutions	at	risk	of	bankruptcy,	such	as	Commerzbank18	and	some	Landes-
banken19.	The	breakdown	of	the	financial	system	and	the	losses	Germany	sus-
tained	as	a	consequence	of	this	provoked	criticism	of	the	US	economic	model	
among	German	politicians	and	economists.	This	also	gave	rise	to	a	feeling	of	
failure,	 in	 particular	 the	 commonly	 shared	 impression	was	 that	 “Germany	
had	swapped	its	profits	from	the	sale	of	its	luxury	cars	into	worthless	US	junk	
securities.”	German	banks	were	free	to	check	the	financial	instruments	they	
were	investing	in,	but	their	desire	to	generate	higher	profits	than	on	the	Ger-
16	 Benjamin	Fox,	‘EU	and	US	aim	for	2015	trade	deal,	exclude	financial	services’,	http://euob-
server.com/news/124159
17	 Konrad	Popławski,	‘The	shape	of	the	banking	union	confirms	Berlin’s	privileged	position	in	
the	eurozone’,	OSW Commentary,	10	January	2014,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2014-01-10/shape-banking-union-confirms-berlins-privileged-position	
18	 Commerzbank	is	Germany’s	second	largest	bank	after	Deutsche	Bank.	Until	the	financial	
crisis	 came,	 this	 institution	was	 developing	 at	 a	 very	 rapid	 rate.	 For	 example,	 it	 bought	
a	share	in	Dresdner	Bank.	However,	the	financial	crisis	caught	it	completely	unawares	and	
forced	it	to	accept	a	bailout	of	€18.2	billion	from	the	German	government	in	exchange	for	
a	25%	stake	in	the	company.	
19	 Landesbanken	are	banks	whose	shareholders	are	German	regions	and	whose	main	task	is	
to	handle	clients	 in	the	regions	and	to	finance	investments.	However,	 these	institutions,	
in	search	of	profits,	also	invested	a	significant	share	of	the	savings	entrusted	to	them	in	US	
real	estate	bonds.
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man	market	pushed	them	into	taking	greater	risk.	Thus	the	European	Union	
is	unlikely	to	agree	to	unilaterally	adopt	the	American	rules	after	the	USA	re-
jected	the	proposal	to	mutually	harmonise	such	rules	pertaining	to	financial	
markets.	
The	estimates	of	the	economic	benefits	of	the	deal	differ.	The	Centre	for	Eco-
nomic	Policy	Research	has	assumed	that	the	agreement	will	contribute	to	an	
increase	in	the	EU’s	GDP	within	the	next	decade	by	only	1%,	and	has	noted	that	
trade	would	benefit	much	more	if	the	fluctuation	of	currency	exchange	rates	
was	 limited20,	 since,	 for	example,	 the	euro	strengthened	against	 the	US	dol-
lar	between	2002	and	2008	by	64%.	The	customs	duty	rates	between	the	USA	
and	the	EU	are	not	high,	ranging	between	3%	and	4%	in	the	case	of	industrial	
goods.	Although	a	reduction	of	these	duties	might	lift	part	of	the	burden	from	
the	automotive	industry,	whose	annual	expenses	related	to	this	reached	US$1	
billion	(as	a	consequence	of	a	2%	customs	duty	rate	imposed	on	car	import	to	
the	USA	and	a	10%	rate	on	car	imports	to	the	EU).	An	analysis	shows	that	the	
following	industries	will	gain	most:	the	metallurgical,	the	food	processing,	the	
chemical,	the	transport	and	the	automotive	industries	and	manufacturers	of	
other	industrial	products21.	This	distribution	of	benefits	from	signing	the	TTIP	
suggests	 that	Germany	will	be	 among	 the	key	beneficiaries	of	 the	deal.	The	
European	Commission	believes,	on	the	grounds	of	surveys,	that	countries	un-
covered	by	the	TTIP	will	also	benefit	from	it	owing	to	the	side	effects	of	the	two	
areas	becoming	richer	and	their	increased	demand	for	import	of	goods.
These	estimates,	somewhat	optimistic	for	Germany,	result	from	the	forecasts	
provided	by	the	 Ifo	 Institute	 in	Munich.	They	predict	 that,	 if	 trade	between	
the	EU	and	the	USA	is	liberalised	to	a	significant	extent,	the	German	economy	
over	the	longer	term	will	gain	4.7%	in	GDP,	and	this	will	be	the	seventh	largest	
gain	after	the	USA	(+13.4%),	the	United	Kingdom	(+9.7%),	Sweden	(+7.3%),	Spain	
(+6.6%),	Greece	(+5.1%)	and	Italy	(+4.9%)22.	These	profits	will	be	generated	main-
ly	as	a	result	of	better	availability	of	products	to	consumers	and	 lower	costs	
of	international	trade	between	the	USA	and	the	EU.	If	the	maximum	variant	
20	 ‘Währungskooperation	bringt	mehr	als	TTIP’,	http://www.boeckler.de/46683_46737.htm
21	 ‘Transatlantic	 Trade	 and	 Investment	 Agreement	 Partnership:	 The	 Economic	 Analysis	
	Explained’,	http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151787.pdf#world	
22	 ‘Dimensionen	 und	 Auswirkungen	 eines	 Freihandelsabkommens	 zwischen	 der	 EU	 und	
den	USA’,	Ifo	Institut,	Munich	2013,	http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publika-
tionen/Studien/dimensionen-auswirkungen-freihandelsabkommens-zwischen-eu-usa-
summary,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf	
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of	trade	liberalisation	is	implemented,	as	many	as	109,000	new	jobs	could	be	
created	 in	 Germany.	 The	 analysis	 criticised	 the	 possible	 negative	 repercus-
sions	the	deal	may	have	for	the	countries	which	are	not	covered	by	it.	
2. The harmonisation of investment regulations 
Capital	relations	between	Germany	and	the	USA	are	similar	to	trade	relation	
patterns	between	the	two	countries.	Germany	has	for	several	decades	invest-
ed	its	trade	surpluses	in	the	US	economy,	ensuring	companies	access	to	cheap	
loans.	According	to	data	from	the	Bundesbank,	Germany	invested	€266	billion	
in	the	USA	in	2012,	while	US	investments	in	Germany	reached	only	20%	of	this	
sum.	Since	the	global	financial	crisis	in	2007,	German	investments	in	the	Unit-
ed	States	of	America	have	been	regularly	growing,	while	US	 investments	 in	
Germany	have	become	stagnant.	It	appears	that	liberalisation	of	capital	flows	
and	legal	regulations	may	offer	opportunities	from	which	both	sides	will	ben-
efit.	The	standardisation	of	investment	conditions	existing	in	the	USA	and	the	
EU	will	also	cut	the	bureaucracy	costs	sustained	by	German	companies,	which	
are	the	eight	 largest	 investor	on	the	US	market23.	 Investments	have	been	in-
cluded	in	the	deal	on	the	initiative	of	the	Americans,	who	would	like	the	EU	to	
extend	its	protection	over	the	entire	investment	cycle	and	not	only	at	the	time	
of	planning.	The	TTIP	negotiations	in	the	bilateral	format,	between	only	the	
USA	and	the	EU,	will	also	enable	new	standards	for	trade	and	investment	pro-
tection	to	be	adopted;	and	this	has	been	impossible	as	part	of	the	World	Trade	
Organisation.	Given	the	great	significance	of	the	transatlantic	market,	other	
countries	will	have	to	adjust	themselves,	and	the	new	standards	will	also	be	
adopted	by	international	organisations24.	However,	Beijing	is	still	unwilling	to	
enter	into	a	similar	agreement,	because	it	does	not	always	respect	investors’	
rights	and	fails	to	provide	sufficient	protection	for	European	companies’	pat-
ents.	In	this	context,	including	the	investment	protection	clause	in	the	TTIP	
would	offer	Brussels	a	strong	argument	in	negotiations	with	Beijing25.
Despite	the	potential	benefits	offered	by	the	regulations	protecting	investors,	
adopting	these	regulations	as	part	of	the	TTIP	has	unexpectedly	become	the	
subject	of	the	most	serious	dispute	as	yet	between	Brussels	and	Washington.	
23	 http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/FDIUS_2013_Report.pdf	
24	 Speech	given	by	the	German	minister	for	the	economy,	Sigmar	Gabriel,	on	5	May	2014	in	
Berlin,	http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Presse/reden,did=637294.html
25	 http://www.die-gdi.de/die-aktuelle-kolumne/article/ein-europaeisches-investitionsab-
kommen-mit-china-begrenzte-wirkung-aber-globale-bedeutung/
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The	EU	fears	that	including	regulations	concerning	the	protection	of	foreign	
investors	 in	 the	 TTIP	will	 put	 into	 jeopardy	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 its	member	
states.	Brussels	suspects	that,	using	these	regulations,	the	USA	in	fact	wants	
to	transplant	American	rules	for	the	protection	of	foreign	investors	 into	Eu-
ropean	legislation.	These	rules	guarantee	the	USA	extensive	competences	in	
protecting	their	rights	in	front	of	supranational	tribunals,	bypassing	national	
economic	courts.	
From	the	very	beginning,	Germany	has	strongly	opposed	such	measures,	in-
cluding	investor-state	dispute	settlement	regulations	in	the	TTIP,	even	though	
regulations	of	 this	kind	are	present	 in	around	1,400	 investment	agreements	
concluded	by	EU	member	states	with	other	countries	worldwide.	These	regula-
tions	give	investors	the	right	to	sue	countries	at	international	tribunals	in	cases	
where	state	institutions	have	infringed	upon	their	economic	interests.	Regu-
lations	of	this	kind	are	at	present	included	as	standard	in	investment	agree-
ments	between	countries.	Before	the	TTIP	negotiations	start,	the	introduction	
of	such	regulations	is	viewed	by	both	Brussels	and	Washington	as	an	opportu-
nity	to	expand	the	scope	of	protection	for	foreign	investments.	The	European	
Commission	was	only	vested	with	the	competences	to	negotiate	agreements	on	
the	protection	of	investments	with	other	countries	following	the	amendment	
of	the	European	Treaties	in	Lisbon	in	2007,	and	intended	to	use	these	preroga-
tives	during	 the	TTIP	negotiations.	However,	a	debate	unfolded	 in	Germany	
at	the	beginning	of	2014	as	to	whether	such	changes	could	lead	to	limiting	the	
federal	government’s	sovereignty	in	the	area	of	economic	policy,	which	some-
times	may	be	contrary	to	the	interests	of	global	corporations.	There	is	concern	
in	Germany	that	US	companies	will	misuse	the	regulations	on	the	protection	of	
foreign	investors,	and	will	use	them	for	contesting	the	German	government’s	
decisions	at	international	arbitration	courts.	
Meanwhile,	Germany	believes	 that	 its	national	 legal	system	offers	sufficient	
protection	of	private	investors’	rights,	and	foreign	companies	should	not	have	
additional	privileges,	since	this	would	infringe	upon	the	country’s	sovereign-
ty26.	 In	 Germany’s	 opinion,	 international	 arbitration	 courts	 work	 in	 a	 non-
transparent	 manner,	 and	 no	 appeals	 procedure	 is	 envisaged.	 The	 German	
government	has	had	problems	linked	to	disputes	being	considered	by	an	arbi-
tration	court	in	connection	with	the	country’s	energy	transformation	policy.	
26	 Konrad	Popławski,	‘The	SPD	presents	its	conditions	regarding	the	acceptance	of	the	TTIP’,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-10-01/spd-presents-its-conditions-
regarding-acceptance-ttip
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Following	the	disaster	at	Fukushima	nuclear	power	plant	in	Japan	in	2011,	the	
German	government	announced	that	some	of	the	German	nuclear	power	plants	
would	be	closed	 immediately.	The	German	companies	which	have	sustained	
losses	as	a	consequence	of	this	decision	have	the	right	to	claim	compensation	
in	front	of	domestic	courts.	In	turn,	Sweden’s	Vattenfall	has	chosen	a	differ-
ent	way.	It	invoked	the	investment	clause	in	the	European	Energy	Charter	and	
sued	the	German	government	at	the	International	Centre	for	Settlement	of	In-
vestment	Disputes	in	Washington.	No	one	in	Berlin	is	certain	what	the	final	
verdict	can	be,	and	how	much	in	damages	Vattenfall	might	be	awarded.	There-
fore,	the	German	government	is	likely	to	strongly	object	to	any	additional	reg-
ulations	concerning	investment	protection	to	be	included	in	the	TTIP;	and	thus	
may	also	provoke	the	Americans	to	fight	for	specific	concessions	in	other	areas.	
It	is	difficult	to	state	beyond	any	doubt	whether	the	German	concerns	over	in-
cluding	regulations	protecting	 foreign	 investors	 in	 the	TTIP	are	 reasonable.	
Before	the	TTIP	negotiations	started,	it	was	believed	that	guaranteeing	stable	
legal	standards	for	investments	that	would	apply	in	the	USA	and	the	EU	was	
especially	vital	from	the	point	of	view	of	small	and	medium-sized	companies,	
and	would	allow	companies	to	cut	expenses	 in	connection	with	 investing	 in	
new	markets.	In	turn,	Berlin	has	emphasised	from	the	very	beginning	that	the	
interests	of	small	and	medium-sized	businesses	must	be	taken	into	considera-
tion	in	the	TTIP.	Investor	protection	has	given	rise	to	a	political	dispute,	even	
though	recent	legal	analyses	conducted	by	the	German	Ministry	for	the	Econo-
my,	for	example,	have	shown	that	the	investment	clause	poses	no	risk	of	limit-
ing	the	federal	government’s	sovereignty.	If	investment	protection	regulations	
analogous	to	those	used	in	a	similar	agreement	between	the	EU	and	Canada	are	
applied	in	the	TTIP,	which	seems	very	likely,	companies	will	be	rather	more	
willing	to	rely	on	German	law	regulations	in	disputes	with	the	government,	
because	these	regulations	offer	better	protection	to	them.	Furthermore,	Ger-
man	business	circles	have	suggested	that	this	risk	can	be	eliminated,	for	ex-
ample,	by	developing	appeals	procedure	rules.	If	investment	protection	regu-
lations	are	eliminated	from	the	TTIP,	it	will	be	more	difficult	to	convince	the	
emerging	economies	to	introduce	similar	rules.	
Furthermore,	even	if	the	law	regulates	this	area	correctly	in	many	countries,	
the	effectiveness	of	national	economic	courts	is	usually	low.	For	this	reason,	
investors	 find	 enforcing	 their	 rights	 extremely	 time-consuming.	 It	 appears	
that	the	dispute	over	the	investor	protection	clause	will	not	impede	ratifica-
tion	of	the	agreement,	but	the	related	controversies	may	delay	the	adoption	of	
the	TTIP.	
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3. The diversification of energy supplies to germany
The	TTIP	may	turn	out	to	be	very	 important,	especially	 if	energy	 issues	are	
included	 in	 it.	 Its	 signing	 could	 create	 a	 better	 legal	 environment	 for	 sup-
plying	Europe	with	fossil	fuels	produced	in	the	USA,	especially	shale	oil	and	
gas.	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	stated	during	her	visit	to	Washington	in	May	
2014	that	the	energy	sector	could	benefit	most	from	the	transatlantic	partner-
ship.	Germany’s	annual	 imports	of	 raw	materials	 for	 energy	production	are	
worth	 in	 total	 around	 €100	 billion.	 The	German	 economy	 also	 recently	 had	
problems	due	to	growing	energy	prices	resulting	from	the	implementation	of	
the	energy	transformation	in	Germany	and	generous	subsidies	offered	to	the	
renewable	energy	sector,	while	US	companies	could	benefit	from	much	lower	
energy	costs.	Although	the	German	system	of	allowances	for	energy-consum-
ing	industry	protects	the	largest	companies	from	an	increase	in	costs,	many	
small	and	medium-sized	businesses	are	facing	ever	more	serious	problems	in	
connection	with	this,	especially	given	the	fact	that	the	amended	act	on	renew-
able	energy	sources	of	July	2014	restricted	the	number	of	firms	eligible	for	the	
allowances.	Public	opinion	in	Germany	is	gradually	coming	to	the	realisation	
that	a	continuation	of	 these	tendencies	may	adversely	affect	the	German	in-
dustry’s	competitiveness	in	the	immediate	future,	and	in	effect	lead	to	a	reduc-
tion	of	workplaces	in	their	country.	
Until	 2013,	 companies	 operating	 in	Germany	 expressed	 their	 dissatisfaction	
with	growing	energy	costs,	mainly	in	the	press.	In	2014,	some	of	them	started	
making	attempts	to	counteract	this.	One	example	is	BASF,	Germany’s	largest	
energy	consumer.	The	company	announced	its	intention	to	build	a	propylene	
production	plant	 in	 the	USA,	stating	 that	 the	main	reason	behind	 this	deci-
sion	was	 the	 fact	 that	 gas	prices	 there	were	 three	 times	 lower	 than	 in	Ger-
many.	The	investment	will	be	worth	more	than	€1	billion	and	will	be	the	largest	
investment	in	a	single	plant	in	the	company’s	history27.	BASF	Board	of	Direc-
tors	explained	 that	 their	decision	was	strongly	 influenced	by	 the	company’s	
financial	results	for	2013.	The	world’s	largest	chemical	corporation	increased	
its	revenues	by	1%	and	profit	by	50%	in	2013	mainly	owing	to	cheap	US	gas.	The	
company	has	recently	put	into	operation	large	gas	processing	installations	in	
the	USA,	thus	increasing	its	US	branch’s	profit	from	€0.5	billion	to	€1.5	billion.	
This	improved	the	entire	corporation’s	profitability	despite	the	stagnation	on	
global	markets.	In	the	next	five	years,	BASF	intends	to	reduce	the	share	of	its	
27	 ‘Fracking:	Billiges	Erdgas	lockt	BASF	in	die	USA’,	http://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.
de/2014/05/02/fracking-billiges-erdgas-lockt-basf-in-die-usa/
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investments	in	Germany	from	1/3	to	1/4,	and	investment	expenses	in	Europe	to	
less	than	50%.	BMW	has	similar	plans.	It	is	planning	to	build	its	largest	factory	
worth	US$1	billion	in	the	USA	by	2016.	Although	in	the	case	of	many	other	firms	
energy	costs	do	not	represent	the	largest	share	in	the	structure	of	expenses,	
energy	prices	at	the	time	of	the	financial	crisis	are	becoming	an	increasingly	
important	factor	in	decisions	concerning	the	location	of	the	investment.	One	
example	is	provided	by	Infineon,	the	manufacturer	of	electronic	components,	
which	spends	annually	around	€120	million	on	energy	(3%	of	its	incomes).	Even	
though	Germany	is	not	the	main	outlet	for	this	firm	(accounting	for	only	23%	
of	its	sales),	as	much	as	47%	of	its	energy	costs	are	generated	in	this	country28.	
Wacker,	the	manufacturer	of	chemical	products,	has	had	a	similar	experience.	
Its	electricity	expenses	over	the	past	five	years	have	grown	by	70%	to	a	level	of	
€0.5	billion,	while	the	corresponding	expenses	of	its	US	competitors	have	fallen	
by	more	than	20%29.	According	to	questionnaires,	almost	half	of	large	compa-
nies	see	that	 their	competitiveness	has	worsened	due	to	the	 implementation	
of	the	energy	transformation,	and	one	third	of	them	are	considering	moving	
production	to	other	countries	due	to	growing	energy	prices30.
Diversification	 of	 energy	 supplies	 to	 Europe	 is	 an	 equally	 urgent	 issue	 for	
Brussels	and	Berlin,	considering	Russia’s	lessening	reliability	and	predictabil-
ity.	Politicians	in	Berlin	are	increasingly	aware	of	this	problem.	Russia	is	the	
largest	supplier	of	crude	oil	(35%),	natural	gas	(38%)	and	hard	coal	(27%)	to	the	
German	market.	On	the	one	hand,	Germany	is	not	as	strongly	dependent	on	
Russian	 supplies	 as	 are	many	Central	 European	 countries.	However,	 on	 the	
other	hand,	Moscow’s	cutting	of	oil	and	gas	supplies	is	no	longer	viewed	as	an	
unrealistic	scenario	in	Germany.	If	this	scenario	is	implemented,	the	economy	
will	sustain	major	losses,	and	energy	prices	will	certainly	grow	significantly.	
In	particular,	Russian	gas	supplies	are	difficult	to	replace,	because	the	next	two	
largest	suppliers,	Holland	and	Norway,	are	unable	to	increase	their	production	
potential	significantly,	and	it	is	clear	that	in	the	case	of	Holland	the	output	is	
going	to	fall31.	In	addition	to	this,	the	German	public	would	not	accept	shale	gas	
28	 Ulf	Sommer,	Markus	Fasse,	 ‘Flucht	nach	Amerika:	Industriekonzerne	beklagen	die	teure	
Energie’,	Handelsblatt,	25	June	2014,	pp.	4-5.	
29	 Christoph	Steitz,	Ernest	Scheyder,	‘Special	Report:	How	fracking	helps	America	beat	Ger-
man	 industry’,	 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/us-usa-germany-power-spe-
cialreport-idUSKBN0ED0CS20140602	
30	 ‘Einigung	bei	Energiewende’,	Handelsblatt,	2	April	2014,	p.	10.	
31	 Anna	 Kwiatkowska-Drożdż,	 Konrad	 Popławski,	 ‘The	 German	 reaction	 to	 the	 Russian-
Ukrainian	conflict	–	shock	and	disbelief ’,	OSW Commentary,	3	April	2014,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_132.pdf
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extraction	on	a	large	scale,	even	though	large	deposits	of	shale	gas	might	exist	
there,	according	to	estimates	from	US	geological	institutes.	Ecological	move-
ments	active	in	Germany	are	spreading	information	about	the	environmental	
risks	posed	by	 this	 technology.	For	 this	 reason,	 the	 import	of	 raw	materials	
from	the	United	States	seems	to	represent	the	simplest	way	of	diversifying	en-
ergy	supplies	to	Europe.	An	additional	benefit	from	this	solution	would	be	a	re-
duction	of	the	competitive	advantage	of	US	industry	resulting	from	low	energy	
prices	stemming	from	restrictions	on	gas	exports	imposed	by	the	US	govern-
ment.	This	solution	would	thus	protect	Germany	from	the	threat	of	its	national	
companies	moving	investments	to	the	USA	and	the	ensuing	liquidation	of	jobs	
in	Germany.	
The	 United	 States	 has	 been	 reluctant	 as	 yet	 to	 grant	 permits	 for	 export	 of	
American	gas	 to	Europe;	and	 these	were	blocked	by	various	supervisory	of-
fices.	The	US	government	did	not	want	 to	 lose	 the	economic	benefits	offered	
by	the	price	competitiveness	of	the	US	industry	as	a	result	of	access	to	cheap	
natural	gas.	Over	the	past	 few	years,	many	US	corporations	have	decided	to	
move	investments	back	to	their	domestic	market,	noticing	the	profits	offered	
by	lower	energy	prices	in	the	USA.	Most	analysts	expect	that	the	United	States	
may	become	a	major	exporter	of	both	LNG	and	crude	oil	in	the	coming	decade.	
From	the	viewpoint	of	 the	EU	and	Germany,	signing	the	TTIP	may	mark	an	
important	step	towards	the	diversification	of	sources	of	gas	supplies	to	Europe.	
If	the	TTIP	is	signed,	it	will	no	longer	be	necessary	to	apply	for	consent	to	ex-
port	natural	gas	to	the	European	market,	since	such	consents	are	not	required	
with	regard	to	countries	covered	by	free	trade	agreements	under	US	law.	Over	
the	past	 few	years,	natural	gas	has	been	imported	from	the	USA	by	Mexico,	
Canada,	Chile	and	South	Korea,	with	which	the	USA	signed	free	trade	agree-
ments.	A	significant	proportion	of	US	gas	exports	has	been	supplied	to	the	Ko-
rean	market32.	Even	though	gas	prices	have	been	much	lower	in	Asia	than	in	
Europe	over	the	past	few	years,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	this	tendency	will	
be	reversed.	Global	gas	prices	may	be	aligned	as	a	consequence	of	the	discovery	
of	new	gas	deposits	worldwide,	technological	progress	in	gas	liquefaction,	re-
duction	of	gas	consumption	in	Japan	as	a	result	of	a	possible	bringing	back	into	
use	of	nuclear	power	plants,	and	probable	pressure	from	Russia	on	European	
countries	as	a	result	of	the	conflict	in	Ukraine.	All	these	factors	may	convince	
some	US	producers	to	export	gas	to	Europe,	where	the	prices	are	higher	than	in	
the	USA,	even	when	the	liquefaction	cost	is	taken	into	account.	
32	 Cathleen	 Cimino,	 Gary	 C.	 Hufbauer,	 ‘US	 Policies	 toward	 Liquefied	 Natural	 Gas	 and	 Oil	
Exports:	An	Update’,	Peterson	Instiute	for	International	Economics,	July	2014,	p.	4.	
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According	 to	media	 reports,	 the	 European	Commission	 sees	 complete	 liber-
alisation	of	exports	of	raw	materials	from	the	USA	to	Europe	as	one	of	the	key	
goals	 of	 the	negotiations33.	This	means	 that	Brussels	will	 also	want	 to	bring	
about	liberalisation	of	regulations	concerning	crude	oil	exports.	The	ban	on	oil	
exports	was	imposed	in	the	United	States	in	the	1970s,	following	the	oil	crisis	
and	a	significant	rise	in	global	oil	prices.	Since	then,	the	USA	has	consistently	
blocked	any	opportunities	 of	 lifting	 this	ban.	However,	 given	 the	 recent	US	
producers’	 successes	 in	 shale	 oil	 extraction,	 these	 restrictions	 have	 become	
a	subject	of	debate.	According	to	analyses	presented	by	the	Us-based	research	
firm	HIS,	lifting	the	ban	would	boost	oil	production	in	the	USA,	and	would	also	
create	new	jobs	there34.	It	was	hinted	in	mid	2014	that	the	US	administration	
might	agree	to	make	concessions	to	Brussels	as	regards	this	issue,	especially	
since	in	July	2014,	for	the	first	time	in	more	than	forty	years,	the	USA	agreed	to	
grant	consent	for	a	firm	to	export	small	amounts	of	crude	oil	to	South	Korea35.	
Speculations	have	appeared	that	the	Americans	might	agree	to	exporting	oil	to	
the	EU	in	exchange	for	a	reduction	of	EU	customs	duties	on	agricultural	prod-
ucts36.	At	present,	it	is	difficult	to	state	how	the	downward	trend	in	oil	prices	
will	 influence	 the	US	government’s	decisions.	 It	may	be	 concluded	 from	 the	
changes	visible	on	the	fuel	market	that	US	shale	oil	producers	are	becoming	
the	strongest	competitors	for	Saudi	Arabia,	which	has	made	attempts	over	the	
past	 few	months	 to	 contain	 their	 expansion	 through	maintaining	 its	 crude	
oil	output	at	a	high	level	and	thus	putting	pressure	on	oil	prices.	It	is	unclear	
whether,	given	this	situation,	Washington	will	want	US	production	firms	to	
be	offered	broader	access	to	the	European	market,	which	might	protect	them	
from	bankruptcy.	
33	 Benjamin	Fox,	‘Leaked	paper:	EU	wants	‘guaranteed’	access	to	US	oil	and	gas’,	https://euob-
server.com/news/124910
34	 http://www.wnp.pl/drukuj/227130_1.html
35	 http://www.wnp.pl/wiadomosci/231549.html
36	 ‘Eksperci:	możliwa	ropa	z	USA	za	otwarcie	rynku	rolnego	w	UE’,	PAP,	29	September	2014.
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Iv. german acTors In The negoTIaTIons
1. The federal government and the political parties 
The	German	government	has	been	one	of	the	major	promoters	of	signing	the	
TTIP,	wanting	thus	to	strengthen	economic	bonds	with	the	United	States.	Ber-
lin	also	 sees	 the	positive	 impact	of	 signing	 the	deal	on	 the	diversification	of	
raw	material	 supplies	 to	 the	 EU,	which	 has	 been	 emphasised	 on	 numerous	
occasions	by	Chancellor	Merkel	in	her	statements	concerning	the	TTIP37.	The	
government	has	also	made	efforts	to	ensure	that	Germany	has	a	strong	repre-
sentation	among	the	negotiators.	Five	out	of	the	thirty-five	members	of	the	ne-
gotiating	team	are	Germans,	and	they	are	the	heads	of	five	working	groups:	for	
competition	policy,	 for	state-owned	companies	and	subsidies,	 for	machinery	
and	electronics,	for	the	chemical	industry	and	for	services.	However,	neither	
the	main	negotiator	nor	his	deputy	are	 representatives	of	Germany38.	There	
are	two	Germans	in	the	group	of	fifteen	negotiation	advisors39.	According	to	
press	reports,	Chancellor	Merkel	made	efforts	to	ensure	that	Günther	Oetting-
er,	who	had	previously	served	as	the	European	Commissioner	for	Energy,	was	
nominated	Commissioner	for	Trade	in	the	new	European	Commission40.	She	
did	not	succeed	in	this,	and	Cecilia	Malmström	from	Sweden	was	chosen	the	
new	EU	Commissioner	for	Trade	in	2014.	Oettinger	was	nominated	Commis-
sioner	for	the	Digital	Economy.	
It	appeared	for	a	long	time	that	the	government	coalition	would	remain	united	
in	its	stance,	since	it	clearly	backed	the	TTIP.	The	Christian	Democrats	support	
the	deal,	which	has	been	emphasised	on	numerous	occasions	by	Chancellor	
Angela	Merkel.	However,	some	deputies	wanted	the	negotiations	to	be	halted	
in	response	to	the	disclosure	of	information	that	US	state	agencies	continued	
tapping	Germany	in	July	2014.	However,	these	views	were	quickly	neutralised	
by	Angela	Merkel,	who	manifestly	supported	the	continuation	of	the	talks41.	
37	 Chancellor	Angela	Merkel’s	press	conference	in	Washington	on	3	May	2014,	http://www.
bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2014/05/2014-05-02-pk-
obama-merkel.html
38	 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151668.pdf	
39	 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1019	
40	 http://www.euractiv.de/sections/europawahlen-2014/merkel-will-oettinger-als-neuen-han-
dels-kommissar-303608?utm_source=EurActiv.de+Newsletter&utm_campaign=b7b52cf4a0-
newsletter_t%C3%A4gliche_news_aus_europa&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_
d18370266e-b7b52cf4a0-47178529	
41	 Stefanie	 Reulmann,	 ‘Merkel	 will	 Gespräche	 über	 Freihandelsabkommen	 fortsetzen’,	
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The	 Social	 Democrats	 revised	 their	 stance	 on	 the	 TTIP	 in	 October	 2014.	
At	the	beginning,	the	SPD	avoided	criticising	the	deal,	regardless	of	the	nu-
merous	 reservations	 from	 left-wing	 non-governmental	 organisations	 and	
think	tanks.	The	party	leader,	Sigmar	Gabriel,	who	serves	as	minister	for	the	
economy	and	deputy	chancellor,	promised	that	the	SPD	would	become	more	
oriented	towards	companies’	needs,	to	strip	the	Christian	Democrats	of	part	
of	its	electorate.	For	this	reason,	he	presented	himself	as	a	staunch	supporter	
of	signing	the	TTIP.	However,	when	the	final	version	of	the	CETA	trade	agree-
ment	negotiated	with	Canada	was	published	by	the	European	Commission,	
which	was	seen	as	an	important	step	towards	signing	the	TTIP	with	the	USA,	
Gabriel	demanded	that	the	investor	protection	regulations	be	removed	from	
it.	It	is	difficult	to	predict	whether	the	parties	to	the	CETA	negotiations	will	
meet	the	SPD	leader’s	demands.	However,	if	investor	protection	regulations	
are	not	included	in	the	CETA,	they	will	most	likely	not	be	present	in	the	TTIP,	
as	well.	Gabriel	has	also	suggested	that	Brussels	should	adopt	a	mixed	proce-
dure	for	the	ratification	of	the	TTIP	and	the	CETA	agreements,	which	means	
that	these	deals	will	have	to	be	put	to	the	vote	at	the	national	parliaments	of	
EU	member	states.	If	this	demand	is	successfully	pushed	through	in	the	EU,	
it	would	increase	the	likelihood	that	investor	protection	regulations	will	be	
removed,	because	the	SPD	might	warn	Brussels	that	the	Bundestag	will	op-
pose	signing	the	TTIP	and	the		CETA?42.	
The	other	parties	in	the	Bundestag,	the	Greens,	the	Pirate	Party	and	the	Left	
Party,	are	clearly	against	the	TTIP.	In	principal,	the	two	parties	use	similar	
argumentation:	the	TTIP	is	a	deal	negotiated	under	dictation	from	large	cor-
porations,	it	will	lower	food	protection	standards,	allow	the	hydraulic	frac-
turing	method	for	shale	gas	extraction	to	be	used	in	Germany,	 it	will	 limit	
democratic	legitimacy,	and	it	will	adversely	affect	the	protection	of	workers’	
rights	and	environmental	protection	standards.	The	Green	Party	and	the	Pi-
rate	Party	are	 lacking	attractive	political	 slogans	at	a	 time	when	Germany	
has	been	consistently	implementing	its	energy	transformation	strategy,	and	
cyber	security	issues	have	become	less	popular.	For	this	reason,	the	two	par-
ties	will	want	 to	build	 their	political	 capital	on	 fears	 linked	 to	 signing	 the	
TTIP	deal.	
http://www.heute.de/bundeskanzlerin-angela-merkel-im-zdf-sommerinterview-zur-spi-
onageaffaere-und-dem-verhaeltnis-zu-den-usa-34027868.html
42	 http://www.zeit.de/2013/50/handelsabkommen-europa-usa
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2. The public
The	German	public	is	divided	over	the	TTIP	issue.	Public	opinion	is	concerned	
above	all	about	the	possible	deterioration	in	food	protection	standards,	since	
US	standards	are	viewed	as	much	lower	than	European	ones.	Several	exam-
ples	of	 food	production	and	processing	 technologies	seen	as	controversial	 in	
Germany	have	been	publicised	in	the	debate	in	the	German	media	(for	example	
the	use	of	GMO	by	American	food	manufacturers,	as	with	genetically	modified	
maize,	or	washing	chickens	with	chlorine	for	disinfection	purposes	as	opposed	
to	thermal	processing	used	in	the	EU).	Circles	linked	to	the	Left	Party	and	the	
Greens	view	the	deal	as	another	example	of	businessmen	and	lobbyists	from	
international	corporations	promoting	their	own	interests,	which	are	contrary	
to	the	expectations	of	the	general	public	and	which	may	result	in	higher	un-
employment	 levels	 in	Germany.	The	manner	 of	 conducting	 the	negotiations	
during	secret	meetings	of	EU	and	USA	representatives	has	also	been	criticised.	
For	example,	the	European	Commission,	under	pressure	from	German	public	
opinion,	decided	in	October	2014	to	declassify	the	negotiating	mandate	granted	
to	it	by	EU	member	states43.	Some	left-wing	politicians	have	made	attempts	to	
fuel	up	people’s	fears	by	comparing	the	TTIP	to	ACTA,	the	controversial	agree-
ment	 intended	at	combating	piracy	on	 the	 Internet.	However,	 they	have	not	
succeeded	at	provoking	unrest	among	the	public	at	a	level	comparable	to	that	
caused	by	ACTA.	Despite	the	many	concerns,	no	major	demonstrations	against	
the	TTIP	have	been	seen	as	yet,	apart	from	the	activity	of	numerous	organisa-
tions	in	cyberspace44.
Public	 opinion	 polls	 suggest	 that	 a	 small	majority	 of	 the	 public	 in	 the	 USA	
and	Germany	see	the	benefits	of	signing	the	TTIP.	According	to	Pew	Research	
Center,	55%	of	Germans	and	53%	of	Americans	supported	the	deal	in	April	2014,	
while	25%	of	Germans	and	20%	of	Americans	were	against	it.45.	In	the	context	
of	the	TTIP,	the	German	public	is	concerned	above	all	about	a	possible	deterio-
ration	 in	 food	quality	standards,	 if	genetically	modified	products	are	admit-
ted	as	imports.	76%	of	Americans	and	only	45%	of	Germans	backed	the	idea	of	
harmonising	US	and	EU	standards	concerning	products	and	services.	When	
asked	 about	 preferences	 concerning	 security	 standards,	 respondents	 from	
Germany	chose	EU	food	protection	standards	(94%),	environmental	protection	
43	 http://www.euractiv.de/sections/eu-innenpolitik/laengst-ueberfaellig-eu-veroeffentli-
cht-ttip-verhandlungsmandat-309069	
44	 https://www.freitag.de/autoren/felix-werdermann/der-neue-anti-ttip-protest
45	 http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/09/support-in-principle-for-u-s-eu-trade-pact/
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standards	(96%),	car	safety	standards	(91%)	and	personal	data	protection	stand-
ards	(85%).	In	the	case	of	the	American	public,	the	answers	are	more	diversi-
fied,	and	American	standards	are	given	preference	over	European	standards	
by	between	49%	and	67%	respondents,	depending	on	the	standard	category.	
Another	argument	raised	by	the	German	opposition	parties	against	the	TTIP	
deal	is	the	threat	to	the	German	welfare	model	posed	by	integration	with	the	
US	market,	which	–	as	viewed	from	Germany	–	offers	much	more	modest	social	
security.	This	is	a	typical	argument	raised	in	Germany	with	regard	to	threats	
linked	to	globalisation,	and	left-wing	parties	are	especially	sensitive	to	such	
argumentation.	 This	 argument	 resonates	 with	 the	 German	 public,	 because	
of	 the	debate	over	growing	poverty,	especially	as	a	consequence	of	so-called	
‘trash	contracts’,	has	been	intensifying	in	Germany	despite	its	good	economic	
situation.	However,	 as	 regards	 complete	 lifting	 of	 import	 duties	 and	 invest-
ment	barriers,	there	are	certain	concerns	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic.	These	
moves	have	been	supported	by	only	41%	of	Americans	and	38%	of	Germans.	The	
concerns	 linked	 to	 this	 agreement	widely	 shared	among	 the	German	public	
have	most	likely	influenced	the	fact	that	65%	of	respondents	prefer	the	federal	
government’s	engagement	in	the	negotiations,	while	28%	of	them	support	EU	
institutions	in	this	context.	According	to	public	opinion	polls,	the	existing	de-
bate	has	slightly	reduced	the	level	of	support	for	the	TTIP	among	the	German	
public.	According	to	a	survey	conducted	by	Emnid	institute	in	October	2014,	
48%	of	Germans	see	this	deal	as	beneficial	for	their	country,	32%	are	of	the	con-
trary	opinion,	and	63%	of	respondents	want	the	negotiations	to	be	continued,	
while	24%	want	them	to	be	discontinued46.	
The	TTIP	issue	has	raised	concern	mainly	among	non-governmental	organi-
sations	which	are	inclined	to	the	left	and	deal	with	ecology,	consumer	rights	
protection	 and	 agriculture.	 The	 non-governmental	 sector	 has	 become	 unit-
ed	 against	 the	TTIP	using	 the	platform	www.unfairhandelbar.de.	The	main	
supporters	 of	 this	 action	 include	 environmental	 organisations	 (Greenpeace,	
Friends	 of	 Earth	 Europe,	 Food	 and	Water	 Europe,	 Attac,	 Powershift,	 Bund,	
NABU,	 Umweltinstitut	 München),	 as	 well	 as	 organisations	 engaged	 in	 the	
struggle	 for	human	rights	and	 the	rule	of	 law	 (Menschenrechte	 3000,	Com-
pact.de)	and	promoting	healthy	food	(Gentechnikfreie	Landwirtschaft,	Bund	
Ökologische	Lebensmittelwirtschaft,	Zukunftsstiftung	Landwirtschaft,	Bio-
land).	They	have	raised	the	key	ecological	aspects	of	the	agreement,	pointing	
46	 The	 Emnid	 survey	 is	 available	 at	 http://www.foodwatch.org/fileadmin/Themen/TTIP_
Freihandel/Dokumente/Emnid-Ergebnisse_TTIP-Umfrage.pdf
28
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
3/
20
15
to	the	threat	posed	to	EU	climate	policy	(as	a	consequence	of	importing	fossil	
fuels	from	the	USA	and	supporting	their	production	in	this	country,	which	is	
harmful	to	the	climate).	They	are	also	concerned	about	the	fact	that	the	TTIP	
may	result	 in	 lower	food	production	standards	being	adopted.	Furthermore,	
German	consumer	organisations	have	pointed	to	the	fact	that	the	EU	and	the	
USA	have	different	food	protection	systems.	European	countries	have	systems	
which	restrict	market	distribution	of	products	which	pose	a	health	risk	ex ante,	
while	in	the	US	system	consumer	health	is	protected	through	court	trials	and	
opportunities	to	bring	complaints	ex post.	Many	organisations	are	concerned	
that	Washington	will	make	 efforts	 to	 push	 through	 its	 own	 food	protection	
system	at	the	expense	of	weakening	EU	control	systems.	
Regardless	of	these	moves,	the	German	NGO	sector	has	not	had	any	major	suc-
cesses	in	opposing	the	Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	being	
signed.	 As	 representatives	 of	 these	 organisations	 admit	 themselves,	 despite	
the	numerous	attempts	to	hold	demonstrations	against	the	TTIP	in	Germany,	
none	of	the	initiatives	has	been	given	sufficient	publicity	by	the	media47.	Their	
successes	 have	 been	 limited	 to	 online	 protests	 in	 social	media	 (for	 example,	
470,000	people	signed	the	online	petition	against	the	TTIP	on	www.campact.
de)	and	propagation	of	actions	aimed	at	signifying	the	resistance	to	the	TTIP	
in	intergovernmental	consultations	held	by	the	European	Commission.	A	dem-
onstration	of	activists	opposing	the	TTIP	has	also	been	observed	in	Brussels,	
where	250	were	detained	after	riots48.	According	to	the	European	Commission’s	
data,	Germans	formed	the	third	most	numerous	group	engaged	in	social	con-
sultations	 concerning	 the	TTIP.	Almost	 23%	of	 the	 150,000	 responses	 sent	 to	
the	European	Commission	came	from	Germany.	 It	 is	worth	noting	that	more	
than	half	of	the	opinion	authors	did	not	agree	to	their	content	being	revealed,	
which	may	prove	that	they	were	sent	on	a	massive	scale	by	non-governmental	
organisations49.	The	European	Commissioner	for	Trade,	Karel	de	Gucht,	shortly	
before	leaving	his	function	in	2014	admitted	this	indirectly,	stating	that	many	
responses	were	 identical,	 and	 thus	 they	might	have	been	 sent	using	a	 single	
pattern	by	members	of	non-governmental	organisations50.	In	January	2015,	the	
47	 https://www.freitag.de/autoren/felix-werdermann/der-neue-anti-ttip-protest
48	 http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-05/freihandelsabkommen-ttip-eu-usa-demonstra-
tionen-bruessel
49	 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-industry/commission-swamped-150000-replies-
ttip-consultation-303681
50	 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/karel-de-gucht-attacke-	
gegen-ttip-13055875.html
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European	Commission	published	the	results	of	public	consultations	concerning	
the	inclusion	of	the	investment	protection	clause	in	the	TTIP,	where	negative	
opinions	clearly	predominated.	97%	of	the	responses	sent	presented	a	negative	
stance,	and	many	of	these	were	most	likely	completed	by	representatives	of	the	
non-governmental	sector.	Although	NGOs	have	not	managed	to	encourage	the	
public	into	making	any	more	decisive	moves	against	the	TTIP,	a	stronger	mobi-
lisation	of	the	opponents	of	this	deal	cannot	be	ruled	out	in	the	coming	months,	
especially	if	the	Bundestag	decides	to	ratify	it.	The	NGO	sector	will	most	likely	
make	attempts	to	spread	the	message	in	the	mass	media	concerning	new	threats	
linked	to	the	TTIP	in	such	areas	as	food	safety,	ecology,	digital	security	or	social	
threats	to	German	citizens.	However,	it	appears	that	the	government,	regard-
less	of	existing	divides	in	the	coalition,	will	be	able	to	present	a	common	stance	
on	the	TTIP	and	to	successfully	defy	opponents	of	the	deal.	
The	concerns	about	a	possible	deterioration	of	food	safety	standards	and	en-
vironmental	threats	need	to	be	viewed	in	the	context	of	German-US	relations.	
According	to	data	from	the	German	Marshall	Fund,	support	for	the	USA	sig-
nificantly	fell	in	Germany	in	2013.	57%	of	German	citizens	wanted	their	coun-
try’s	policy	to	be	more	independent	from	the	USA	(an	increase	of	17	percentage	
points).	Only	19%	supported	strong	German-US	relations	(a	decrease	of	20	per-
centage	points).	Nevertheless,	60%	expected	that	 the	USA	would	remain	the	
global	leader	(a	decrease	of	3	percentage	points).	The	worsened	perception	of	
the	United	States	in	Germany	has	certainly	been	influenced	by	the	informa-
tion	revealed	in	2013	by	the	former	CIA	worker,	Edward	Snowden,	that	US	se-
cret	 services	had	been	 tapping	 the	 communications	of	German	citizens	 and	
firms	for	years	on	a	massive	scale.	What	raised	special	concern	 in	Germany	
was	the	fact	that	the	US	services	had	violated	the	right	to	privacy,	one	symbol	
of	which	were	the	media	reports51,	which	were	later	dispelled,	that	even	Chan-
cellor	Angela	Merkel’s	private	phone	was	tapped52.	However,	Germany	was	un-
able	to	force	the	USA	into	signing	an	agreement	that	would	set	more	detailed	
rules	 of	 co-operation	 between	 the	 secret	 services,	 under	which	US	 services	
would	be	obliged	to	reduce	the	scope	of	tapping	in	Germany53.	Washington	has	
51	 ‘Range:	 Kein	 Beweis	 für	 Ausspähung	 von	 Merkels	 Handy’,	 http://www.faz.net/aktuell	/
politik/inland/nsa-affaere-kein-beweis-fuer-ausspaehung-von-angela-merkels-
handy-13315918.html
52	 ‘Man	hört	sich	nicht	ab	unter	Freunden’,	Handelsblatt,	24	July	2014,	p.	8.
53	 Marta	Zawilska-Florczuk,	Kamil	Frymark,	‘The	NSA:	the	impact	of	the	wiretapping	scan-
dal	on	German-American	relations’,	OSW Commentary,	 14	 January	2014,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-01-14/nsa-impact-wiretapping-scandal-ger-
man-american-relations
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disregarded	Berlin’s	demands	to	this	effect.	In	July	2014,	Germany	accused	two	
lower-ranking	officers	from	the	Federal	Ministry	of	Defence	and	the	Federal	
Intelligence	Service	of	spying	for	the	USA,	and	forced	a	resident	of	the	US	intel-
ligence	services	to	leave	Germany.	This	unprecedented	move	with	regard	to	an	
allied	state	was	probably	dictated	by	the	desire	to	put	pressure	on	the	USA	to	
limit	the	activity	of	its	intelligence	services,	and	also	served	the	German	gov-
ernment’s	 interests,	because	it	was	intended	to	convince	public	opinion	that	
German	secret	services	needed	better	funding54.	
The	recent	disputes	between	Germany	and	the	USA	over	the	operation	of	the	
secret	services	may	adversely	affect	the	TTIP.	The	German	public	may	fear	that	
the	TTIP	will	offer	US	corporations	more	opportunities	to	interfere	with	Ger-
man	citizens’	private	data.	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel,	fearing	public	protests,	
did	not	decide	 to	ratify	 the	ACTA	agreement	on	counteracting	digital	piracy	
in	2012	in	the	Bundestag.	Furthermore,	people	in	Germany	are	convinced	that	
German-US	relations	are	lacking	balance.	Examples	of	these	include	US	corpo-
rations’	failure	to	comply	with	German	law	and	the	strict	treatment	of	Euro-
pean	firms	by	US	institutions.	High	financial	penalties	imposed	on	European	
banks	violating	US	regulations	and	the	forbearing	approach	adopted	by	Ger-
man	state	institutions	while	controlling	US-based	Internet	corporations	that	
violate	German	regulations	concerning	privacy	have	become	symbols	of	this	
asymmetry55.
3. The business circles
Representatives	of	business	circles	lie	at	the	other	extreme.	They	strongly	sup-
port	the	government’s	actions,	emphasising	that	signing	the	TTIP	agreement	
will	mean	enormous	opportunities	for	the	German	economy56.	The	largest	in-
dustrial	associations,	such	as	the	German	Industry	Association	and	the	Ger-
man	Chamber	of	Industry	and	Commerce	support	the	deal	almost	unreserv-
edly.	The	two	associations	even	want	the	controversial	investor-state	dispute	
settlement	regulations	to	be	included	in	the	deal,	although	their	representa-
tives	have	made	the	reservation	that	the	success	of	the	entire	deal	might	not	
54	 Justyna	 Gotkowska,	 ‘The	 consequences	 of	 the	 spy	 scandal	 in	 Germany’,	 OSW Analyses,	
23	 July	 2014,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-07-23/consequences-
spy-scandal-germany
55	 Handelsblatt,	22	July	2014,	p.	10.
56	 http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article127607351/Der-Mittelstand-braucht-das-
Freihandelsabkommen.html
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depend	 on	 the	 implementation	 thereof.	 Company	 representatives	 are	 aware	
of	the	fact	that	legal	disputes	between	European	firms	and	US	administration	
have	dominated	transatlantic	relations	over	the	past	few	years;	and	this	may	
mean	that	European	companies	will	benefit	more	from	investor	protection	in	
the	future.	Criticism	from	business	circles	concerned	only	the	scope	of	the	ne-
gotiated	deal.	The	head	of	the	German	Chamber	of	Industry	and	Commerce	has	
emphasised,	for	example,	that	not	only	large	corporations	but	also	small	and	
medium-sized	businesses	should	benefit	from	the	agreement.	Associations	of	
the	key	German	industries,	such	as	the	chemical,	the	machine-building	and	
the	automotive	industry,	have	been	actively	engaged	in	promoting	the	TTIP.	
Although	 the	key	 sectors	 of	 the	German	economy	plainly	 support	 the	TTIP,	
there	are	also	opponents	of	the	agreement,	representing	mainly	smaller	sec-
tors	of	the	economy.	The	German	Farmers’	Association	sees	more	benefits	than	
threats	in	the	agreement	being	signed,	but	still	emphasises	that	the	USA	with	
its	large	domestic	market	is	for	the	time	being	a	smaller	outlet	for	German	agri-
cultural	products	than	Russia.	Representatives	of	this	association	have	pointed	
out	that	meat	must	remain	protected	by	import	quotas.	The	USA	has	had	a	com-
petitive	advantage	due	to	the	use	of	hormones	in	animal	breeding.	Organisa-
tions	of	producers	of	cultural	goods	have	also	protested	against	the	TTIP,	even	
though	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	 no	mandate	 to	 negotiate	 the	 consent	
to	 liberalise	 trade	 in	audiovisual	goods.	 Importers	of	goods	 from	developing	
countries	as	part	of	fair	trade	also	fear	that	the	TTIP	will	sanction	a	system	of	
subsidies	between	the	USA	and	the	EU,	thus	discriminating	against	producers	
from	poorer	countries.	Since	signing	the	TTIP	will	adversely	affect	the	genuine	
interests	of	these	sectors,	one	cannot	exclude	the	possibility	that	they	will	sup-
port	(also	financially)	the	opponents	of	this	deal.	
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v. The consequences of sIgnIng The agreemenT
The	chances	that	the	TTIP	will	be	signed	seem	high.	Considering	the	long	per-
spective	of	signing	the	agreement	(a	timeframe	of	as	much	as	two	years),	it	re-
mains	feasible	that	resistance	among	the	German	public	will	grow,	especially	if	
the	economic	situation	in	the	country	worsens	or	levels	of	popular	support	for	
the	government	fall.	The	effectiveness	of	the	non-governmental	sector,	which	
as	of	yet	has	been	unable	to	influence	the	public	strongly	enough	for	the	deal	
to	be	torpedoed,	will	also	be	a	major	decisive	factor.	However,	further	moves	
to	achieve	this	goal	should	be	expected.	At	present,	it	is	difficult	to	publicise	
the	protests	against	the	TTIP	due	to	the	tense	international	situation,	where	
numerous	 conflicts	 worldwide	 attract	 the	 attention	 of	 public	 opinion	 (the	
Russian-Ukrainian	war,	the	destabilisation	of	the	situation	in	the	Middle	East	
and	the	debate	on	the	risk	of	terrorist	attacks	in	Germany).	An	intensification	
of	the	protests	might	reduce	Germany’s	determination	to	sign	the	agreement.	
The	German	government	has	so	far	insisted	that	the	TTIP	should	be	ratified	
by	consent	from	national	parliaments.	This	solution	is	intended	to	add	legiti-
macy	to	the	deal,	but	this	solution	carries	the	risk	that	some	EU	member	states	
might	veto	the	deal.	There	is	still	a	consensus	in	the	government	coalition	in	
Germany	that	the	TTIP	should	be	signed.	However,	the	SPD	may	still	change	
its	mind.	Its	leader	has	recently	suggested	that	the	SPD	might	be	opposed	to	the	
investor	protection	regulations.	Therefore,	it	is	unclear	what	stance	the	Social	
Democrats	will	take	on	the	TTIP,	if	the	other	countries	disagree	about	elimi-
nating	these	regulations	from	the	agreement.	
The	TTIP	also	offers	a	chance	for	diversifying	raw	material	supplies	to	the	EU.	
Even	though	the	deal	is	unable	to	guarantee	competitive	price	conditions	for	
the	export	of	raw	materials	from	the	USA	to	the	EU,	the	past	few	months	have	
suggested	that	a	reduction	of	high	gas	prices	in	Asia	is	increasingly	possible.	
The	liberalisation	of	US	procedures	will	create	stable	institutional	conditions	
for	foreign	trade	in	raw	materials,	especially	if	the	TTIP	lifts	some	of	the	re-
strictions	 imposed	on	American	oil	exports.	The	European	market	has	been	
uncompetitive	with	 the	Asian	market	 for	US	gas	exporters	 for	 two	 reasons.	
Firstly,	gas	prices	 in	the	EU	were	 lower	than	in	Asia,	where	the	prices	went	
up	after	Japan	had	ceased	using	nuclear	energy.	Secondly,	some	Asian	coun-
tries,	such	as	South	Korea	and	Singapore,	signed	free	trade	agreements	with	
the	USA,	which	eliminated	the	requirement	to	seek	consent	for	the	export	of	
natural	gas	to	these	countries.	The	TTIP	will	automatically	 lift	 this	require-
ment	in	the	case	of	gas	exports	to	the	EU.	Even	with	the	present	level	of	prices,	
the	European	market	may	be	appealing	to	US	producers	of	shale	gas,	especially	
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if	there	is	a	significant	oversupply	of	gas	on	the	US	market.	American	produc-
ers	may	also	find	it	more	profitable	to	export	gas	without	the	required	permits	
to	the	EU	than,	for	example,	to	apply	for	permits	to	export	gas	to	Japan.	
If	the	TTIP	negotiations	succeed,	stronger	economic	bonds	will	be	established	
between	the	USA	and	the	EU,	which	may	also	translate	into	better	political	re-
lations.	The	two	economic	blocs,	which	have	similar	standards	and	production	
norms,	will	become	connected	through	much	stronger	economic	interests	and	
will	be	able	 to	adopt	more	similar	stances	on	many	economic	 issues	 in	rela-
tions	with	the	emerging	economies.	Change	in	this	direction	is	something	Ber-
lin	expects.	Germany	is	wondering	with	a	dose	of	anxiety	whether	attempts	by	
BRICS	countries	(Brazil,	China,	India,	Russia	and	the	Republic	of	South	Africa)	
to	build	an	institutional	architecture	reminiscent	of	the	Western	one	(a	BRICS	
regional	development	bank	reminiscent	of	the	World	Bank	or	a	BRICS	financial	
fund	reminiscent	of	the	International	Monetary	Fund)	might	lead	to	tension	in	
relations	with	the	West.	Given	this	context,	transatlantic	relations	reinforced	
through	the	TTIP	may	turn	out	to	be	an	additional	 instrument	for	 influenc-
ing	the	emerging	economies,	which	will	want	to	have	access	to	the	extremely	
lucrative	EU	and	US	markets.	Furthermore,	the	sealing	of	the	TTIP	deal	may	
also	facilitate	negotiations	as	part	of	the	World	Trade	Organisation.	Companies	
from	emerging	markets	will	want	to	be	given	similar	conditions	of	access	to	
the	transatlantic	market	(similar	standards	and	customs	duty	rates)	like	their	
European	 and	 American	 competitors.	 The	 German	 government	 wants	 Ger-
man	companies	to	be	offered	investment	and	trade	facilitations	on	the	emerg-
ing	markets	through	such	moves	as	 liberalisation	of	trade,	better	protection	
of	copyright	and	patents,	protection	of	foreign	investments	and	the	introduc-
tion	of	Western	norms	and	standards.	However,	Germany	will	make	efforts	to	
ensure	that	the	TTIP	negotiation	process	and	the	ramifications	of	its	possible	
signing	do	not	result	in	isolating	the	EU	and	the	USA	from	the	rest	of	the	world.	
Such	a	solution	would	not	be	beneficial	for	a	country	which	heavily	relies	on	
exports	and	has	strong	economic	bonds	with	BRIC	countries.	
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APPENDIX
EU and US customs duty rates on some groups of goods (an average from 2012) 
Product group eu usa
Dairy	products 52.9 19.9
Sugars	and	confectionary 32.1 14.4
Beverages	and	tobacco 19.9 14.0
Clothing 11.5 11.6
Textiles 6.6 7.9
Oilseeds,	fats	&	oils 2.0 4.8
Fruit,	vegetables,	plants 10.7 4.7
Cotton 0.0 4.1
Leather,	footwear,	etc. 4.2 3.8
Coffee,	tea 6.2 3.3
Cereals	 17.1 3.1
Transport	equipment 4.3 3.1
Chemicals 4.6 2.8
Preparations 2.7 2.4
Animal	products 20.4 2.2
Minerals	and	metals 2.8 1.7
Electrical	machinery 2.8 1.7
Non-electrical	machinery 1.9 1.2
Other	agricultural	products 4.3 1.1
Petroleum 2.8 1.1
Fish	&	fish	products 11.8 0.8
Wood,	paper,	etc. 1.0 0.5
source:	http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_38104-544-2-30.pdf?140618145124,	p.	9
